The task of implementing new security initiatives and developing systems to rapidly respond to an attack or natural disaster is proving difficult and slow-going at the nation’s ports.
According to recent reports from the Government Accountability Office, a Congressional watchdog that investigates government spending, the vulnerability of the nation’s port system became apparent following the 2001 terrorist attacks. But it was the devastating 2005 hurricane season that revealed deficiencies in many ports’ ability to quickly return to normal operations following an event. Studies of the efforts ports have made to rectify these issues indicate that while some progress has been made, significant challenges remain.
To gauge the impact of and response to natural disasters, the GAO conducted a yearlong review of 17 ports that faced the highest risk of damage from earthquakes or hurricanes. Of those ports, 11 had been damaged by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita or Wilma in 2005.
Katherine Siggerud, the GAO’s director of physical infrastructure, issued a Congressional report on the study on March 28 and identified communications, personnel management and interagency coordination as the primary areas of difficulty facing port officials.
&”The most visibly apparent challenge port authorities experienced was dealing with damaged infrastructure, including structural damage to buildings and piers, and silting and debris clogging key waterways,” Siggerud wrote in the report. &”Port authorities also reported difficulties restoring power, water and other utilities.”
According to the study, the Ports of Miami; Houston; Gulfport, Miss., and Mobile, Ala., were collectively forced to spend more than $18.5 million on removing debris and dredging sand and silt from piers following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma. The storms also knocked out basic services such as water and electricity for extended time periods.
It was discovered that only seven of the 17 ports examined had contingency plans in place to reestablish these services following an event. The Port of New Orleans had a five- to 10-day supply of water and enough generators to produce power for three to five days, none of which proved sufficient following Katrina.
Port officials were also unaware of several programs that provide federal funding for repairs or for preventive measures. A hazard mitigation grant program even offers to cover up to 75 percent of the cost of implementing new safety measures immediately following a disaster. No port has applied for available funds in a predisaster hazard mitigation program, which would fund projects aimed at reducing risk to people and structures caused by natural disasters.
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&”We found that port authorities’ understanding of FEMA’s assistance was dependent on their relationship with the local or state emergency management office — a stakeholder that is not necessarily involved in the forums where the port’s natural disaster planning occurs,” Siggerud said in the report.
Officials from the American Association of Port Authorities told the GAO that in some cases ports were aware of the programs, but found them too confusing. As a result, ports were slow to get back up and running. It took New Orleans six months to return to &”predisaster operational levels”; however, three container cranes have yet to be fixed because port officials believe the tenants won’t be returning. At Gulfport, only three of 12 warehouses have been reopened, prompting clients to move to other port facilities.
Communications were another problem area. Following hurricane evacuations, many port officials found it difficult to locate their workers to let them know they could return. Those that did return discovered they had no credentials to show police and emergency management crews guarding port facilities, making reentry difficult. At the port of Gulfport, for instance, officials were not allowed to enter the port for two weeks after Katrina.
Another communication gap resulted from ports addressing natural disasters and terrorist attacks as separate types of events. The problem with this strategy, said GAO, is that while all organizations working in the ports must participate in security efforts, not all of them would be involved in planning for a response to a natural disaster.
&”Unlike security planning, where the Secretary of Homeland Security can establish an Area Maritime Security Committee with broad representation across port stakeholders, natural disaster planning carries no such requirement,” said the report.
As a result, the GAO suggests ports develop an &”all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery.”
In addition to the difficulties responding to and planning for attacks or natural disasters, there have been a host of problems implementing security measures set forth in the SAFE Port Act. Stephen Caldwell, GAO’s director of homeland security, presented the results of a review of the SAFE Port Act in testimony before a Congressional subcommittee on April 26. The GAO study called into question the Coast Guard’s ability to continue staffing key security positions, noted that a program to develop a worker identification card system was behind schedule and highlighted a potentially significant loss of revenue in Customs & Border Protection.
According to Caldwell’s testimony, the SAFE Port Act, which took effect in October 2006, required the Coast Guard to work with foreign ports to review and strengthen their security measures. The Coast Guard has made progress on this front; it had visited 86 countries by last month, and plans to visit 29 more by the end of the year. However, foreign ports must be periodically reexamined and the pace at which that occurs has been upped.
For the Coast Guard, the program requires special training &”since very few people in the Coast Guard have had international experience or extensive port security experience.” Current officers who started with the program and have acquired valuable experience as port inspectors are now being forced to leave due to the Coast Guard’s rotation policy. The GAO predicts the Coast Guard will have difficulty staffing and training replacements.
Caldwell noted that the implementation of a federally mandated Transportation Worker Identification Credential had been &”plagued by delays” and had resulted in workers’ having to go through redundant background checks.
&”A truck driver, for example, is subject to background checks for all of the following: unescorted access to a secure area at a port, unescorted access to a secure area at an airport, expedited border crossings, hauling hazardous materials or hauling arms of ammunition,” said Caldwell.
The Transportation Safety Administration has a July 1 deadline to implement the TWIC program at 10 of the highest-risk ports, but widespread implementation is likely to be difficult.
&”Significant challenges remain in enrolling about 770,000 persons at about 3,500 facilities in the TWIC program,” said Caldwell.
Shifting the resources of Customs & Border Protection to focus on preventing terrorist actions has already weakened efforts to prevent counterfeit products from entering the country. The shift has also impaired CBP from carrying out one of its most important duties — collecting revenues.
According to GAO, CBP collected some $30 billion in customs revenue in 2006, making it the second-largest revenue generator for the U.S. Despite it’s size, CBP does not publicly report on its customs revenue actions, making it impossible to assess accountability. But the GAO found that CBP has had trouble keeping up as global trade has increased and as the government brokers more free trade agreements with foreign governments.
&”Despite a legislative mandate to at least maintain minimum specific numbers of staff in certain key customs revenue positions, the numbers of staff in several of these positions have declined since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security,” said Caldwell.
GAO contends that CBP has no system in place to fill positions. The number of Import Specialists dropped to 892 in March 2006 from 984 in March 2003. The number had, however, grown to 1,000 by December 2006.
&”CBP has not yet determined how many staff it needs in customs revenue positions, their associated support positions and other positions that contribute to the protection of customs revenue,” said Caldwell.